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CERCLA CONTRIBUTION: 




The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) provides broad authority to the federal and state 
governments to address releases of hazardous substances.1  One such 
authority is the ability of the United States or states to hold liable for the 
costs of cleanup any party that is responsible for the presence of hazardous 
substances at certain hazardous waste sites.2  Because the cost of cleanup 
can often be astronomical, some parties responsible for the presence of 
hazardous substances may wish to settle their liability.  If a settlement is 
deemed an “administrative settlement” or a “judicially approved settlement” 
under CERCLA, such a settlement provides a settling party with two 
tremendous benefits.  First, it protects a settling party from claims of contri-
bution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.  Second, it allows a 
settling party to seek contribution from any person who is not a party to a 
settlement who is responsible for the presence of hazardous substances at 
the site at issue.  Unfortunately, there is a lack of clarity as to what 
constitutes an administrative settlement.  This article examines what consti-
tutes an administrative settlement. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, on the eve of President Reagan assuming office Congress 
enacted CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the identification and clean-
up of the releases of hazardous substances into the environment.3  Specif-
ically, CERCLA was enacted “in response to the serious environmental and 
health risks resulting from the existence of inactive hazardous waste sites.”4  
 
 *J.D. 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  The author is an associate at Friedman 
Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP.  
1. U.S. EPA, CERCLA Overview, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2008). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000). 
3. William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 
107 and 113, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 193, 193 (1996). 
4. United States v. Union Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 478, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing United 
States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998)). 
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Congress had two goals in enacting CERCLA.5  The first goal was the 
cleanup of our nation’s hazardous waste sites.6  The second goal, known as 
the “polluter pays” principle, was to place the cost of cleanup on those 
parties that Congress deemed responsible for the creation of such hazardous 
waste sites.7 
One of the ways that CERCLA facilitates the achievement of 
Congress’s dual goal is that it permits the United States8 or states to hold 
liable any party that is responsible, either in whole or in part, for the pres-
ence of hazardous substances at certain hazardous waste sites, often referred 
to as Superfund sites, for the costs of the sites’ cleanup.9  These potentially 
liable parties are known as “Potentially Responsible Parties” (PRPs).  
Specifically, Section 107(a) of CERCLA defines a PRP as a person who 
falls within one or more of the following four categories: 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) a ny person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or treatment or arranged with a transporter for trans-
port for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any 
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party 
or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
 
5. Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995). 
6. Id. 
7. See id. (“CERCLA’s dual goals are to encourage quick response and to place the cost of 
that response on those responsible for the hazardous condition.”). 
8. The EPA by delegation has the powers of the United States under Section 107(a) of 
CERCLA.  See Exec. Order No. 12,580 § 2(g), 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000).  CERCLA has several other mechanisms that also facil-
itate the achievement of Congress’s two goals.  For example, CERCLA authorizes the President, 
under certain circumstances: 
[T]o remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to 
such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . or take any other 
response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the President 
deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment. 
Id. § 9604(a)(1).  In addition, the President may issue cleanup orders “as may be necessary to 
protect public health and welfare and the environment.”  Id. § 9606(a).  The President may also 
“require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to 
abate [an] imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment.”  Id. 
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(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances 
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels 
or sites selected by such person.10 
Hence, an entity even marginally responsible for the presence of minimal 
hazardous substances at a Superfund site may be held liable for the site’s 
cleanup.11 
In order for the United States or states to hold a PRP liable for the costs 
of cleanup, it must first engage in a removal12 or remedial action13 and then 
seek reimbursement pursuant to Section 107(a) of CERCLA,14 the cost re-
covery section,15 in an action referred to as a cost recovery action.  In order 
to seek reimbursement in a cost recovery action, the United States or state 
must establish that the PRP is: (1) in fact a PRP as defined by CERCLA; (2) 
that hazardous substances16 were disposed of at the “facility”;17 (3) that 
 
10. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). 
11. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2336 (2007). 
12. The term “removal” is defined as: 
[T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, 
such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of haz-
ardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, 
assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the 
disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary 
to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the 
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). 
13. CERCLA defines “remedial action” as: 
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to 
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so 
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health 
or welfare of the environment. 
Id. § 9601(24).  See also id. § 9604.  Section 104 of CERCLA states in relevant part: 
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of 
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of 
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present any 
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is 
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange 
for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous sub-
stance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . or take any other response measure 
consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to 
protect the public health or welfare or the environment. 
Id. § 9604(a)(1). 
14. Id. § 9607(a).  Section 107(a) provides in relevant part that any responsible party “shall 
be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government 
or a [s]tate or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.”  Id. 
15. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004). 
16. CERCLA defines a “hazardous substance” as a substance that is so designated by the 
EPA pursuant to Section 9602 of CERCLA or by one of four other environmental statutes.  42 
U.S.C. § 9601(14).  Specifically, the term “hazardous substance” means: 
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there has been a “release”18 or “threatened release” of hazardous substances 
from the facility into the environment; and (4) that the release caused the 
incurrence of “response costs.”19 
Any PRP that can be held liable by the United States or state in a cost 
recovery action pursuant to Section 107(a) can be held liable for all cleanup 
costs, even if the PRP’s responsibility for contamination is minimal; 
CERCLA allows for joint and several liability.20  Such joint and several 
liability can result in astronomical liability.  In 1992, the average cost of a 
single Superfund site was $24 million.21  Today, many cleanups are 
 
(A) any substance designated pursuant to [S]ection 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any 
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to [S]ection 
9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under 
or listed pursuant to [S]ection 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not including 
any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has been 
suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under [S]ection 1317(a) 
of the title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under [S]ection 112 of the Clean 
Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with 
respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to [S]ection 2606 of Title 
15.  The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof 
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under 
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural 
gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or 
mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas). 
Id. 
17. CERCLA defines a “facility” as: 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, 
or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located. 
Id. § 9601(9). 
18. CERCLA defines a “release” as “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, 
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environ-
ment.”  Id. § 9601(22). 
19. Id. § 9607(a).  See also Araiza, supra note 3, at 203-04 (setting forth the necessary 
elements for a cost recovery action). 
20. Araiza, supra note 3, at 194 n.5.  See United States v. Colo. & E.R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 
1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is . . . well settled that [Section] 107 imposes joint and several liability 
on [parties liable under Section 107] regardless of fault.”); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 
572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that CERCLA liability is joint and several 
except when defendant can prove actual divisibility of harm).  Section 107(a) of CERCLA also 
allows those who voluntarily clean up a site to recover costs from other responsible parties.  
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (2007). 
21. William H. Rogers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the Complexity of the 
Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 422 (1992).  Average cleanup costs do not include 
transaction costs, which can amount to millions of additional dollars.  See generally JANE PAUL 
ACTION & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE EXPERIENCES OF 
INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 43-49 (1992). 
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estimated to cost far more.  For example, the cleanup of the Hudson River 
is estimated at $460 million.22 
In order to deflect the pain of joint and several liability, any PRP held 
liable to the United States or state pursuant to Section 107(a) may “seek 
contribution,” pursuant to Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, “from any other 
person who is liable or potentially liable under Section 9607(a) . . . during 
or following any civil action . . . under [S]ection 9607(a).”23  Hence, a PRP 
held liable under Section 107(a) may seek contribution from other PRPs 
pursuant to Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA.24  However, pursuant to Section 
113(f)(1), the maximum amount of contribution available from each PRP 
may not exceed that PRP’s share of responsibility.25   
Despite the availability of Section 113(f)(1) contribution, there are 
numerous reasons a PRP may still be inclined to try to avoid the possibility 
of government imposed Section 107(a) liability including, but not limited 
to: (1) the magnitude of liability with which a PRP may be saddled pursuant 
to a Section 107(a) cost recovery action brought by the United States or 
state; (2) the burden of having to bring suit in order to recover contribution 
pursuant to Section 113(f)(1); and (3) the great possibility of being unable 
to recover contribution from all responsible entities for a variety of reasons, 
including the failure to find all PRPs to the site.26  Thus, the only way for a 
PRP to effectively avoid the problems of such joint and several liability is 
to settle.27  
In addition to avoiding joint and several liability, settlement provides a 
settling PRP with two additional tremendous benefits.  First, pursuant to 
Section 113(f)(2), “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United 
States or a [s]tate in an administrative or judicially approved settlement 
shall not be liable for claims for contribution [pursuant to Section 113(f)(1)] 
 
22. Cindy Skrzycki, GE Ads Zap the EPA Over PCB Cleanup, WASH. POST, July 24, 2001, 
at E01. 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
24. Id. 
25. See United States v. Union Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 478, 485-86 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“The 
contribution liability of a responsible party under [Section] 113 corresponds to that party’s 
equitable share of the total liability.”); Saco Steel Co. v. Saco Def., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 803, 809 (D. 
Me. 1995) (“Liability for contribution under [Section] 113(f) is not joint, but several.”); N.J. Dept. 
of Envtl. Prot. & Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 821 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (D. N.J. 
1993) (explaining that liability is several under Section 113); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. 
Supp. 397, 414 (D. N.J. 1991) (discussing the several nature of liability pursuant to Section 113); 
Araiza, supra note 3, at 206 (explaining that liability is several under Section 113). 
26. See William W. Balcke, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 
Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123, 149 (1988) (“[I]n some cases, only a small percentage of the 
waste at a site may be traceable to identifiable potentially responsible parties; even a smaller 
percentage may be traceable to solvent parties.”). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9622. 
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regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”28  Second, pursuant to 
Section 113(f)(3)(B): 
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a 
[s]tate for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the 
costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved 
settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not a 
party to a settlement referred to in paragraph [f](2).29 
Thus, settlement with the United States or state provides a PRP with protec-
tion from contribution actions brought by other PRPs pursuant to Section 
113(f)(2).30  And, pursuant to Section 113(f)(3)(B), PRPs may also seek 
contribution from other PRPs who have not settled their liability.31 
However, in order for a PRP that has settled its liability to receive the 
protection of Section 113(f)(2) from contribution actions, a settlement must 
constitute either an “an administrative or judicially approved settlement.”32  
And, in order to receive the benefit of Section 113(f)(3)(B) of being able to 
seek contribution from other PRPs who have not yet settled their liability, a 
settlement must constitute either “an administrative or judicially approved 
settlement.”33  There is, however, great uncertainty as to what constitutes an 
administrative settlement.34  Given the importance to settlers that their 
settlements protect them from contribution actions, as well as provide them 
with the ability to seek contribution, this article examines what constitutes 
an administrative settlement. 
Part II of this article examines the limited guidance that the statutory 
language of CERCLA provides in regard to what constitutes an administra-
tive settlement.  Part III of this article explores what the courts have said 
 
28. Id. § 9613(f)(2). 
29. Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 
30. It is important to note that the contribution protection provision of Section 113(f)(2) does 
not provide a complete exemption from further liability under CERCLA or state law, but rather 
provides immunity from claims for contribution relating to the “matters addressed in the 
settlement.”  Am. Special Risk Ins. Co. v. City of Centerline, 180 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001). 
31. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 (E.D. Ca. 2003) 
(stating that settlement “further[s] the purpose of CERCLA by providing immediate funds ‘to 
enhance environmental protection, rather than the expenditure of limited resources on protracted 
litigation.’” (quoting In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1029) (D. 
Mass. 1989))).  Section 113 only furthers these goals as it is “designed to ‘maximize the participa-
tion of responsible parties’ in hazardous waste cleanup and expedite that cleanup by ‘encouraging 
early settlement, thus reducing the time and expense of enforcement litigation.’” Id. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2)-(3)(B).  See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S.  
157, 168 (2004) (holding that the only way a PRP that has settled its liability may assert a claim 
for contribution is if it satisfies the conditions of Section 113(f)(3)(B)). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2)-(3)(B). 
34. This article does not address what constitutes a judicially approved settlement. 
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constitutes an administrative settlement under Sections 113(f)(2) and 
113(f)(3)(B).35  Part III also highlights disagreements that exist amongst 
certain courts with regard to what constitutes an administrative settlement.36 
II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
Although Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA provides contribution protec-
tion to PRPs that have entered into administrative settlements37 and Section 
113(f)(3)(B) provides PRPs that have entered into administrative settle-
ments with the ability to seek contribution,38 neither Sections 113(f)(2) nor 
113(f)(3)(B) provide any guidance as to what constitutes an administrative 
settlement.  This is not surprising given that CERCLA is “notorious for its 
lack of clarity and poor draftsmanship.”39  Some provisions of CERCLA 
do, however, provide minimal guidance as to what may or may not consti-
tute an administrative settlement. 
First, Section 122(d)(1)(A) of CERCLA makes clear that a settlement 
“with respect to remedial action under Section 9606 of [CERCLA]” may 
not be entered as an administrative settlement, except in the case of certain 
de minimus settlements.40  Second, Section 122(g)(1) of CERCLA makes 
clear that under certain circumstances, “a final settlement with a potentially 
responsible party in an administrative or civil action under [S]ection 9606 
or 9607 of [CERCLA] . . . if such settlement involves only a minor portion 
of the response costs at the facility concerned” (i.e., a de minimus 
settlement) may be entered as an administrative settlement.41  And third, 
 
35. No cases decided after January 1, 2008, are included in this article. 
36. The purpose of these examinations is to inform the reader of pertinent case law pertain-
ing to the question of what constitutes an administrative settlement and to provide clarity to a 
murky area of law, not to pass judgment on the validity of judicial holdings.  There may be cases 
on point that are not discussed in this article.  However, extensive research has been conducted in 
the hope that all relevant cases are included in the article. 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). 
38. Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 
39. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993).  
See Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2000) (“CERCLA is 
hardly a model of legislative clarity.”); Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 246 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is widely recognized that many of CERCLA’s provisions lack clarity and 
conciseness.”); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that 
CERCLA has “acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions and an indefi-
nite, if not contradictory, legislative history”); Artesian Water Co. v. Gov’t of New Castle County, 
851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) (“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision . . . [and] 
has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting.”). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A).  See Responsible Envtl. Solutions Alliance v. Waste Mgmt., 
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (explaining that Section 112(d)(1)(A) of 
CERLA requires an agreement concerning a remedial action, executed in accordance with Section 
106 of CERCLA, to be entered as a consent decree by a district court). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). 
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CERCLA is unambiguous that the following procedures must be followed 
for entry of de minimus settlements42 and cost recovery settlements with the 
United States:43 (1) at least thirty days before the settlement may become 
final, the head of the department or agency which has jurisdiction over the 
proposed settlement must publish in the Federal Register notice of the pro-
posed settlement; (2) for a thirty-day period beginning on the date of 
publication in the Federal Register, an opportunity must be provided to 
persons who are not parties to the proposed settlement to file written com-
ments relating to the proposed settlement; and (3) the head of the 
department or agency shall consider any comments.44 
Despite the above-discussed provisions of CERCLA pertaining to what 
may and may not constitute an administrative settlement, a universe of 
questions regarding what constitutes an administrative settlement for pur-
poses of Sections 113(f)(3)(B) and 113(f)(2) remain unanswered.  Thus, the 
courts have been left to discern what constitutes an administrative settle-
ment for such purposes. 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
Below is a discussion of what the courts have said constitutes an 
administrative settlement pursuant to Sections 113(f)(3)(B) and 113(f)(2).  
Although both Sections 113(f)(3)(B) and 113(f)(2) utilize the term “admin-
istrative settlement,” and although the term administrative settlement as 
used in both sections may very well have the same meaning, this article 
examines the courts’ interpretations of the term as used in each provision 
separately. 
A. SECTION 113(F)(3)(B) 
Many courts have wrestled with questions regarding what constitutes 
an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B).  Three 
main categories of questions have arisen with regard to a Section 
113(f)(3)(B) settlement.  The first category of questions involves the resolu-
tion of CERCLA liability.  The second category of questions examines the 
provisions of CERCLA, pursuant to which an administrative settlement 
may be entered for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B).  The third category 
involves the seemingly random questions raised by the case of ITT 
Industries v. Borgwarner, Inc.45 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id. § 9622(h). 
44. Id. § 9622(i)(1)-(3). 
45. No. 06-2393, 2007 WL 3023995 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2007). 
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1. Category One: Resolution of CERCLA Liability 
One of the primary questions with which courts have grappled is 
whether a purported administrative settlement must resolve a settling PRP’s 
CERCLA liability or merely its liability under some other law, such as a 
state environmental law, to constitute an administrative settlement for pur-
poses of Section 113(f)(3)(B).  All of the courts that have struggled with 
this question have held that for a settlement to provide the benefits of Sec-
tion 113(f)(3)(B) to a settling PRP, the settlement must resolve that PRP’s 
CERCLA liability.46 
Although the purpose of this article is not to pass judgment, it is note-
worthy that such a holding seems obvious given that the resolution of liabil-
ity for “response action[s]” is a prerequisite to Section 113(f)(3)(B) contri-
bution.47  The term “response action” is a CERCLA-specific term “describ-
ing an action to clean up a site or minimize the release of contaminants in 
the future.”48  Moreover, although the legislative history of CERCLA is not 
always informative when attempting to discern the meaning of CERCLA 
 
46. See Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 202 n.19 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement is with a state entity and concerns only non-
CERCLA liability, a party may not bring a contribution action under [Section] 113(f)(3)(B).”); 
Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e read Section 
113(f)(3)(B) to create a contribution right only when liability for CERCLA claims, rather than 
some broader category of legal claims, is resolved.”); BASF Catalysts LLC v. United States, 479 
F. Supp. 2d 214, 225 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that the consent order that did not resolve the 
party’s CERCLA liability is not an administrative settlement within the meaning of CERCLA); 
Differential Dev. 1994, Ltd. v. Harkrider Dist. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 727, 741 (S.D. Tx. 2007) 
(“[When] a [s]tate agency has entered into a settlement agreement that does not specifically 
resolve the participant’s CERCLA liability to the [s]tate, that agreement is not a ‘settlement’ of 
CERCLA liability that can serve as the basis for a [S]ection 113(f)(3)(B) claim.”); Asarco, Inc. v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV 04-2144-PHX-SRB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2626, at *46-47 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006) (holding that a person must resolve its CERCLA liability, and not merely its 
liability under some other source of law, to be eligible for Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution); City 
of Waukesha v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“[R]esolving 
liability with respect to non-CERCLA claims, such as [a] claim arising under state environmental 
statutes, does not create a CERCLA contribution right under [S]ection 113(f)(3)(B).”); W.R. 
Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *18-21 
(W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005) (holding that a party is not entitled to maintain a Section 113(f)(3)(B) 
contribution action when the party settles only its liability under state law). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 
48. Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 95-96.  The Second Circuit further explained: 
CERCLA defines the term “response” to mean “remove, removal, remedy, and reme-
dial action” and all “enforcement activities related thereto.” The terms “remove” or 
“removal” means [inter alia] the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances 
from the environment.  The terms “remedy” or “remedial action” mean inter alia 
“those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to 
removal actions . . . to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances.” 
Id. at 96 n.6 (internal citations omitted). 
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provisions,49 the legislative history of the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), which enacted Section 113 of 
CERCLA, provides further support for the conclusion that CERCLA 
liability is a prerequisite to Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution.50  The House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce report states that Section 113 “clari-
fies and confirms the right of a person held jointly and severally liable 
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties.”51  
Hence, amongst the courts there is unanimous—and seemingly correct—
agreement that Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not permit contribution actions 
based on resolution of any liability other than CERCLA liability.52  Several 
questions have, however, arisen before the courts regarding when a 
settlement actually resolves a settling PRP’s CERCLA liability such that 
Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution is available. 
a. State Resolution of CERCLA Liability 
Although the courts are in agreement that a settlement must resolve a 
PRP’s CERCLA liability in order for that settling PRP to be eligible for 
 
49. See Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A 
multitude of courts have roundly criticized the statute as vague, contradictory, and lacking a useful 
legislative history.”); HRW Sys., Inc. v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 327 (D. Md. 
1993) (“[T]he legislative history of CERCLA gives more insight into the ‘Alice-in-Wonderland’-
like nature of the evolution of this particular statute than it does helpful hints on the intent of the 
legislature.”); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985) (“CERCLA has 
acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not 
contradictory, legislative history.”); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 
1983) (explaining that the legislative history of CERCLA is “unusually riddled by self-serving and 
contradictory statements”). 
50. Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 96. 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 99-252(I), at 79 (1985) (emphasis added).  See THE SENATE ENVIRON-
MENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE REPORT, S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 44 (1985) (containing 
similar language). 
52. See, e.g., Asarco, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2626, at *47 (holding that a person is 
required to resolve its CERCLA liability, and not only its liability under some other source of law, 
to be eligible for Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution); Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 95 (“We 
read [S]ection 113(f)(3)(B) to create a contribution right only when liability for CERCLA claims, 
rather than some broader category of legal claims, is resolved.”); Waukesha, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 
1115 (“[R]esolving liability with respect to non-CERCLA claims, such as [a] claim arising under 
state environmental statutes, does not create a CERCLA contribution right under [S]ection 
113(f)(3)(B).”); Zotos, Int’l, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *18-21 (holding that a party is 
not entitled to maintain a Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action when the party settles only its 
liability under state law); Schaefer, 457 F.3d at 202 (“[W]hen an administrative or judicially 
approved settlement is with a state entity and concerns only non-CERCLA liability, a party may 
not bring a contribution action under [Section] 113(f)(3)(B).”); BASF Catalysts LLC, 479 F. Supp. 
2d at 219-20 (holding that RCRA Consent Order that did not resolve the party’s CERCLA liability 
is not an administrative settlement within the meaning of CERCLA); Differential Dev. 1994, Ltd., 
470 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (“[When] a [s]tate agency has entered into a settlement agreement that 
does not specifically resolve the participant’s CERCLA liability to the [s]tate, that agreement is 
not a ‘settlement’ of CERCLA liability that can serve as the basis for a [S]ection 113(f)(3)(B) 
claim.”). 
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Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution, and although expressly stated in Section 
113(f)(3)(B) that a state may resolve a PRP’s CERCLA liability in an 
administrative settlement, several courts have wrestled with the question: 
Under what circumstances may a settlement—that purports to resolve the 
PRP’s CERCLA liability between a PRP and a state—constitute an admin-
istrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B)?  Specifically, the 
federal courts are split as to whether a settlement between a PRP and a 
state, that purports to resolve the PRP’s CERCLA liability, may constitute 
an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B) if the state 
did not receive authorization from the EPA to enter into the settlement prior 
to entering into the settlement.53 
Several federal courts have held that in order for a settlement that 
alleges to resolve a PRP’s CERCLA liability with a state to actually resolve 
the PRP’s CERCLA liability, such that the settlement may constitute an 
administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B), the state must have 
prior authorization from the EPA to enter into the agreement.54  The first 
court to reach this conclusion was the Federal District Court for the West-
ern District of New York in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos International, Inc.55  
In Zotos, Grace, the current owner of a parcel of property where hazardous 
waste had been deposited approximately fifty years prior, and thus a PRP, 
commenced an action seeking contribution from Zotos, another PRP, 
pursuant to Section 113(f)(3)(B) for costs it incurred in investigating and 
 
53.  Asarco, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2626, at *19; Waukesha, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1117; 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 398 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Ferguson v. Arcata Redwood Co., No. C03-05632SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18015, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 5, 2005); Benderson Dev. Co., Inc. v. Neumade Prods. Corp., No. 98-CV-0241 SR, 
2005 WL 1397013, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005); Zotos Int’l, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8755, at *16; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 
2003); Pfohl Bros. Landfill Site Steering Comm. v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 134, 
154-55 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 
54. See Asarco, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2626, at *19 (“[The] state is not required to seek 
authorization from the EPA before entering into settlements concerning environmental cleanups, 
but in that event, the settlement could not be deemed to resolve CERCLA liability.”); Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d at 401-02 (“[T]o bring a [Section] 9613(f)(3)(B) claim, 
CERCLA liability must have been resolved.  A state has no CERCLA authority absent specific 
agreement with the federal Environmental Protection Agency.”); Waukesha, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 
1117-18 (holding that a settlement agreement entered into by the City of Waukesha and the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, that purportedly resolved the city’s CERCLA 
liability, did not constitute an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B) 
because the EPA had not delegated authority to the state to enter into a settlement agreement that 
would resolve the city’s CERCLA liability); Ferguson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18015, at *14-15 
(dismissing a Section 113(f)(3)(B) claim because the state agency did not seek permission from 
the EPA prior to entering into the settlement agreement at issue and the state agency did not assert 
that it was exercising authority under CERCLA). 
55. No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *16 (W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005). 
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remediating contamination on its property.56  In 1984, Grace had entered 
into a legal agreement known as an “Administrative Order on Consent” 
(AOC)57 with the New York Department of Environmental Conservation 
(DEC) for a Phase II investigation of the site.58  Four years later, on 
September 28, 1998, Grace entered into another AOC with the DEC 
requiring that Grace develop and implement a remedial investigation,59 
feasibility study,60 and if necessary, a remedial program for the property.61  
Subsequently, in 2000, Grace sought contribution pursuant to Section 
113(f)(3)(B) from Zotos believing that the AOCs it entered with the DEC 
constituted administrative settlements for purposes of Section 
113(f)(3)(B).62 
The issue before the Zotos court was whether the 1984 AOC or the 
1998 AOC constituted administrative settlements for purposes of Section 
113(f)(3)(B).63  The Zotos court held that for an AOC between a PRP and a 
state to resolve the PRP’s CERCLA liability, and thus constitute an admin-
istrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B), the state must have made an 
application to and entered into a contract or cooperative agreement with the 
EPA.64  If a state acts only on its own authority, the resulting AOC does not 
resolve the PRP’s CERCLA liability, and thus may not constitute an 
 
56. Id. at *1. 
57. An AOC is a legal agreement under the authority of the Superfund law between the EPA 
or a state and a PRP. 
58. Id. at *4. 
59. A Remedial Investigation “serves as the mechanism for collecting data to: characterize 
site conditions; determine the nature of the waste; assess risk to human health and the environ-
ment; and conduct treatability testing.” U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/remedy/ 
sfremedy/rifs.htm (last visited May 14, 2008). 
60. A Feasibility Study “is the mechanism for the development, screening, and detailed 
evaluation of alternative remedial actions.”  Id. 
61. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *4-5. 
62. Id. at *5.  Zotos allegedly arranged to have hazardous substances, which were owned or 
possessed by Zotos, disposed of on the Grace property.  Id. at *6.  Zotos was allegedly liable 
under CERCLA as an arranger.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2000).  As noted earlier, the categories of 
“covered persons” are: (1) owners, (2) operators, (3) arrangers, and (4) transporters. Id. 
§ 9607(a)(1)-(4).  CERCLA imposes “arranger” liability on “any person who by contract, agree-
ment, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility . . . owned or operated by 
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances.”  Id. § 9607(a)(3).  A person 
can be liable as an arranger with or without the knowledge that hazardous substances would be 
deposited at the particular site.  United States v. Hardabe, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 
1990).  Arranger liability may attach even if the arranger does not own or physically possess the 
hazardous substances, so long as the arranger constructively possesses the materials.  Steven G. 
Davison, Governmental Liability Under CERCLA, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 47, 78-79 (1997) 
(citing United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
63. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755,  at *10. 
64. Id. at *14-15. 
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administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).65  The Zotos court 
reasoned: because (1) Section 10466 of CERCLA provides that certain 
CERCLA authority may be delegated to a state if the state makes applica-
tion to and enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with the EPA; 
and (2) one of the actions that may be delegated to a state under Section 104 
is the ability to enter into a settlement agreement resolving a PRP’s 
CERCLA liability, it flows logically that absent express delegation by the 
EPA to a state to enter into a settlement agreement that purportedly resolves 
a PRP’s CERCLA liability, such a settlement agreement does not resolve 
the PRP’s CERCLA liability, and thus may not constitute an administrative 
settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).67 
Subsequent to Zotos, several courts held that in order for a state to 
resolve a PRP’s CERCLA liability pursuant to a settlement agreement, the 
state must have prior authorization from the EPA to enter into the agree-
ment.68  However, several courts have disagreed, holding that a state may 
resolve a PRP’s CERCLA liability pursuant to a settlement absent prior 
authorization from the EPA, and that such a settlement may constitute an 
 
65. Id. at *16-17. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9604.  The relevant provision of Section 104 states: 
A [s]tate or political subdivision thereof or Indian tribe may apply to the President to 
carry out actions authorized in this section.  If the President determines that the [s]tate 
or political subdivision or Indian tribe has the capability to carry out any or all of such 
actions in accordance with the criteria and priorities established pursuant to [S]ection 
9605(a)(8) of this title and to carry out related enforcement actions, the President may 
enter into a contract or cooperative agreement with the [s]tate or political subdivision 
or Indian tribe to carry out such actions.  The President shall make a determination 
regarding such an application within 90 days after the President receives the 
application. 
Id. § 9604(d)(1)(A). 
67. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *14-15. 
68. See Asarco, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV 04-2144-PHX-SRB, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2626, at *19 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006) (“[The] state is not required to seek authorization 
from the EPA before entering into settlements concerning environmental cleanups, but in that 
event, the settlement could not be deemed to resolve CERCLA liability.”); Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]o bring a 
[Section] 9613(f)(3)(B) claim, CERCLA liability must have been resolved.  A state has no 
CERCLA authority absent specific agreement with the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency.”); Ferguson v. Arcata Redwood Co., No. C03-05632SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18015, at 
*14-15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005) (dismissing a Section 113(f)(3)(B) claim because the state 
agency did not seek permission from the EPA before entering into the settlement agreement and 
the state agency did not aver that it was exercising authority under CERCLA); City of Waukesha 
v. Viacom Int’l Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (holding that a settlement 
agreement between the City of Waukesha and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 
which purportedly resolved the city’s CERCLA liability, did not constitute an administrative 
settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B) because the EPA had not delegated authority to the state to 
enter into a settlement agreement that would resolve the city’s liability). 
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administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).69  One such court 
explicitly rejected the reasoning set forth by the Zotos court.  In Seneca 
Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc.,70 the Federal District Court for the 
Western District of New York rejected the reasoning set forth by the Zotos 
court for requiring that in order for a state to resolve a PRP’s CERCLA 
liability, and thus for a settlement agreement between a state and a PRP that 
purports to resolve some of the PRP’s CERCLA liability to constitute an 
administrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B), the state 
must have prior authorization from the EPA to enter into the agreement.71  
The Seneca Meadows court held that “[a]lthough a [s]tate may not be able 
to act on behalf of the federal government absent delegation of authority 
from the EPA,” and although a state may not be able to resolve a PRP’s 
CERCLA liability completely absent such an express delegation, CERCLA 
does not mandate that a state receive authorization from the EPA prior to 
entering into a settlement agreement with a PRP that purports to resolve 
some of the PRP’s CERCLA liability for that settlement agreement to 
constitute an administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).72  The 
Seneca Meadows court asserted that the language of Section 107(a)(4)(A) 
provides support for its conclusion, which provides that all PRPs “shall be 
liable for . . . all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United 
States Government or a state or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the 
national contingency plan.”73  Thus, because CERCLA does not mandate 
that a state obtain authorization from the EPA prior to cleaning up hazard-
ous waste sites and recovering costs pursuant to CERCLA from PRPs,74 it 
 
69. See, e.g., Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 
(W.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a party that has entered into a consent order with the DEC can seek 
Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution where the consent order expressly states that the party resolved 
its liability to the state for purposes of CERCLA, even if the DEC was not operating pursuant to a 
cooperative agreement with the EPA); Benderson Dev. Co., Inc. v. Neumade Prods. Corp., No. 
98-CV-0241SR, 2005 WL 1397013, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (holding that a party that 
entered into a consent order with the DEC, which provided that “the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
Section 9613(f)(3) shall apply,” may seek contribution pursuant to Section 113(f)(30(B) despite 
the appearance that the DEC did not have prior authorization from the EPA); Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
Co. v. City of Lodi, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that an agreement 
resolving a PRP’s liability to an agency of the state for some of its response costs is a Section 
113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement despite lack of evidence that state received prior EPA 
authorization); Pfohl Bros. Landfill Site Steering Comm. v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 
2d 134, 154-55 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that Orders on Consent entered into between PRPs and 
the DEC settling the PRPs’ CERCLA liability to New York in connection with the cleanup and 
the remediation of a landfill constituted administrative settlements under Section 113(f)(3)(B), 
even where there was no indication that the DEC had prior authorization from the EPA). 
70. 427 F. Supp. 2d 279 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 
71. Seneca Meadows, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 286-87. 
72. Id. at 287. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000). 
74. Seneca Meadows, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d. at 287. 
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flows logically that a state does not need prior authorization to enter into a 
settlement agreement with a PRP in order for that settlement agreement to 
resolve some of the PRP’s CERCLA liability such that the settlement may 
constitute an administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).75 
Because there is a disagreement amongst the federal courts as to 
whether EPA authorization is necessary for a settlement between a state and 
PRP to constitute an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 
113(f)(3)(B), PRPs should be mindful of this disagreement, prior to enter-
ing into a settlement with a state, if they believe they may subsequently 
wish to seek contribution pursuant to Section 113(f)(3)(B).  It may be 
prudent for any PRP entering into a settlement with a state to first determine 
whether the state has received prior authorization from the EPA to enter 
into the agreement, and if not, whether it is willing to risk possible 
foreclosure of the ability to seek contribution pursuant to Section 
113(f)(3)(B). 
b. Settlement of Only Investigation Costs 
There is also judicial disagreement amongst courts to address the issue 
of whether a settlement of only CERCLA investigation costs is sufficient to 
constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement.  In ITT 
Industries, Inc. v. Borgwarner, Inc.,76 the issue before the Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan was whether an AOC entered 
into by ITT Industries, Inc. with the EPA, which required ITT Industries to 
investigate suspected contamination of a site, was an administrative settle-
ment within the meaning of Section 113(f)(3)(B) such that ITT could seek 
contribution.77  The district court held that “the administrative order by 
consent cannot be construed an administrative settlement within the mean-
ing of CERCLA [Section] 113(f)(3)(B),” because “[t]he consent order does 
not purport to resolve any party’s liability—not ITT’s, not the United 
States’ and not that of any [s]tate.”78  Subsequently, in a memorandum 
 
75. Id. 
76. No. 1:05-CV-674, 2006 WL 2460793 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2006). 
77. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2460793, at *1-2. 
78. Id. at *6.  In support of its conclusion, the district court did not cite to any language 
found in the AOC, but did note that ITT, in one of its briefs, stated: 
There has been no final settlement of liability between ITT and the U.S. EPA or of any 
other environmental agency regarding the investigation and remediation of the con-
taminated sites.  Indeed the U.S. EPA gives up nothing regarding potential claims 
against ITT or any other entity.  The AOC requires ITT to conduct the SRI/FFS, but 
does not release ITT of further liability at the NBFF OU1 site. 
Id. at *6. 
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opinion denying a motion for reconsideration,79 the district court responded 
to ITT’s assertion that the court misconstrued Section 113(f)(3)(B) as 
requiring ITT to show that it resolved all of its liability as opposed to just 
some of its liability:80 
To the contrary, the Court fully understood the language of 
[Section] 113(f)(3)(B), which expressly states that the section 
applies to “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United 
States or a state for some or all of a response action or for some or 
all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially 
approved settlement.”  Here, however, by the terms of the 
agreement, Plaintiff did not resolve its liability in any fashion, 
except as to EPA’s costs to oversee completion of the investigation 
as ordered.81 
Such a statement indicates that the Federal District Court for the Western 
District of Michigan believes that Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not require the 
resolution of all CERCLA liability, but that resolution of investigation costs 
is not sufficient for Section 113(f)(3)(B) purposes.82 
The other courts to address the issue of whether an administrative 
settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B) must settle more than a party’s 
investigation costs, disagree.  In Responsible Environmental Solutions 
Alliance v. Waste Management, Inc.,83 the Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio held that an AOC that settled a party’s 
investigation costs constituted an administrative settlement under Section 
113(f)(3)(B).84  And, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin in City of Waukesha v. Viacom International, Inc.85 stated in 
dictum that Section 113(f)(3)(B) “creates a CERCLA contribution right 
only where a party resolves some or all of its liability for a ‘response 
 
79. ITT Indus., Inc., v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-674, 2006 WL 2811310, at *10 
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2006) (mem.). 
80. Id. at *2. 
81. Id. (citations omitted). 
82. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the appellate court, in affirming the district court’s 
dismissal of ITT’s contribution claim, did not base its decision on the notion that resolution of 
investigation costs is insufficient for Section 113(f)(3)(B) purposes, but rather noted four other 
bases for its decision.  ITT Indus., Inc. v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 06-2393, 2007 WL 3023995, at 
*6-7 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).  The Sixth Circuit, however, did not disparage the Western District 
of Michigan’s reasoning.  Id.  It is unclear whether the Western District of Michigan’s conclusion 
that resolution of only investigation costs is insufficient for the purposes of Section 13(f)(3)(B) 
remains good law.  Id. 
83. 493 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Ohio 2007). 
84. Responsible Envt’l Solutions, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. 
85. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Wis. 2005). 
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action.’”86  CERCLA defines the term “response” to mean “remove, 
removal, remedy, and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms 
‘removal’ and ‘remedial action’) include enforcement activities related 
thereto.”87  The terms “remove” and “removal” are defined by CERCLA as 
“[t]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the 
environment, [including] . . . such actions as may be necessary to monitor, 
assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous 
substances.”88  Hence, given the definition of “response action,” the 
Waukesha court intimated that the plain language of CERCLA permits a 
settlement that settles only a party’s CERCLA investigation costs to 
constitute an administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).  
Therefore, there is arguably disagreement amongst the courts as to whether 
resolution of a party’s CERCLA investigation costs can constitute a Section 
113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement. 
c. Possibility of Future Liability 
Although the courts are not in agreement with regard to some of the 
issues pertaining to the resolution of CERCLA liability as a prerequisite to 
obtaining Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution, there is agreement amongst the 
two courts found to have addressed the issue of whether a settlement that 
contains language leaving open the possibility of future CERCLA liability 
may constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement.  Language 
in such agreements appears to take one of two forms.  In one form, a 
provision of the settlement leaves the possibility open to the state or EPA to 
hold the settling PRP liable under CERCLA if the settling PRP does not 
satisfactorily perform the work set forth in the purported administrative 
settlement.  In the second form, a settlement enunciates that the EPA or 
state reserves the right to take action under CERCLA.  The courts have held 
that both types of limiting language in settlements negates the possibility 
that such settlements may constitute Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative 
settlements.89 
 
86. Waukesha, 404 F. Supp. at 1115. 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (2000). 
88. Id. § 9601(23) (emphasis added). 
89. See, e.g., Waukesha, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (holding that a provision that “leaves open 
the possibility” that the state or the EPA may still seek to hold the settling PRP liable under 
CERCLA if the PRP does not satisfactorily perform the work set forth in the agreement, results in 
an agreement that does not constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) settlement); Consol. Edison Co. v. 
UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that language in the agreement reserving 
the department’s right to take action under CERCLA “‘deemed necessary as a result of a 
significant threat resulting from the Existing Contamination or to exercise summary abatement 
powers’—leaves open the possibility that the department might still seek to hold [Consolidated 
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The Eastern District of Wisconsin addressed the question of whether a 
purported administrative settlement is in fact an administrative settlement 
for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B)—if a provision exists in the settlement 
that leaves open the possibility that the state or EPA may seek to hold the 
settling PRP liable under CERCLA if the PRP does not satisfactorily 
perform the work set forth in the purported administrative settlement—in 
City of Waukesha v. Viacom International, Inc.90  The Waukesha court held 
that a provision in the agreement that “leaves open the possibility” that the 
state or the EPA may still seek to hold the PRP liable under CERCLA, if 
the PRP has not satisfactorily performed the work set forth in the agree-
ment, does not resolve the PRP’s CERCLA liability, and thus is not an 
administrative settlement for purposes of obtaining Section 113(f)(3)(B) 
contribution.91 
Similarly, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. UGI Utilities, Inc.,92 the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that language enunciated in the 
agreement at issue, which reserved the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation’s right to take action under CERCLA 
“deemed necessary as a result of a significant threat resulting from the 
Existing Contamination or to exercise summary abatement powers” negated 
the possibility of the agreement constituting a Section 113(f)(3)(B) adminis-
trative settlement.93  The court explained that this was so because the 
agreement left open the possibility that the Department might still seek to 
hold the settling PRP liable under CERCLA, and therefore the agreement 
did not allow the settling PRP to resolve its CERCLA liability.94  Although 
only two courts were found to have addressed the issue of whether language 
in settlements that leaves open the possibility of future CERCLA liability 
negates the possibility that such agreements may constitute Section 
113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlements, a PRP wishing to settle its 
CERCLA liability pursuant to an administrative settlement should try to 
 
Edison] liable under CERCLA” negates the possibility that the agreement constitutes a Section 
113(f)(3)(B) settlement). 
90. Waukesha, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
91. Id.  Although the purpose of this article is not to pass judgment on the holdings of the 
courts, it is noteworthy that Section 122(f)(5) states explicitly that “[a]ny covenant not to sue 
under this subsection shall be subject to satisfactory performance by such party of its obligations 
under the agreement concerned.”  42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(5). 
89. 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005). 
90. Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 97. 
94. Id. at 98.  It is noteworthy that Section 122(f)(6) states that except under certain circum-
stances, “a covenant not to sue a person concerning future liability to the United States shall 
include an exception to the covenant . . . where such liability arises out of conditions which are 
unknown at the time the President certifies . . . that remedial action has been completed at the 
facility concerned.”  42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A). 
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avoid agreements that contain language leaving open the possibility of 
future CERCLA liability. 
d. Unilateral Administrative Orders 
There is also judicial agreement that a PRP may not recover all or some 
portion of the costs that the PRP incurred in a Section 113(f)(3)(B) contri-
bution action for work it performed pursuant to an EPA issued unilateral 
administrative order (UAO).95  EPA issued UAOs are not agreements, but 
rather are EPA issued mandates requiring PRPs to undertake certain re-
sponse actions.96  The two courts found to have addressed the issue are in 
agreement that a UAO may not constitute an administrative settlement for 
purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B), and thus a party may not recover all or 
some portion of the costs incurred for work it performed pursuant to an 
EPA issued UAO.97  The Federal District Court for the District of Kansas in 
Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States98 explained that because “[S]ection 
113(f)(3)(B) is one that limits a plaintiff’s right to contribution to those 
response costs for which it has resolved its liability in settlements with the 
United States or a state,” and because a UAO does not resolve a party’s 
CERCLA liability, the UAO is not an administrative settlement for 
purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B).99  Hence, a PRP that is issued a UAO 
should not hope to recover some of the costs it incurred for work performed 
pursuant to the UAO. 
2. Summary 
The courts are in agreement that a settlement must resolve a PRP’s 
CERCLA liability for the settlement to constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) 
 
95. See, e.g., Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (D. Kan. 
2006) (holding that a party could not seek contribution under Section 113(f)(3)(B) for costs 
incurred responding to a UAO); Blue Tee Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., No. 03-5011-CV-SW-FJG, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15360, at *20 (W.D. Mo. June 27, 2005) (“Compliance with a UAO is not 
the same as an ‘administrative settlement’ for purposes of the separate contribution promises of 
[Section] 113(f)(3)(B).”). 
96. U.S. EPA Superfund Unilateral Orders, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/cleanup/ 
superfund/orders.html (last visited June 2, 2008). 
97. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; Blue Tee Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15360, at *19-20. 
98. 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Kan. 2006). 
99. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.  In Raytheon, the EPA issued a UAO to 
Raytheon, which identified Raytheon as a PRP and required Raytheon “to excavate and properly 
dispose of TCE-contaminated soils from an insular location.”  Id. at 1140.  Raytheon performed 
the work required in the UAO.  Id.  Subsequently, Raytheon sought recovery of some or all of the 
costs it had incurred from the Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to Section 113(f)(3)(B).  Id. 
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administrative settlement entitling the settling PRP to contribution.100  
However, there is some disagreement amongst the courts regarding when a 
settlement that purports to resolve a settling PRP’s CERCLA liability does 
so in a manner sufficient for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B).  A PRP must 
be aware of the holdings of the courts with regard to settlement of 
CERCLA liability when entering into a settlement that purports to resolve 
the PRP’s CERCLA liability should the settling PRP wish to seek contribu-
tion in the future. 
3. Category Two: Provisions of CERCLA, Pursuant to Which a 
Party May Enter Into an Administrative Settlement 
There has been a great deal of confusion and uncertainty regarding the 
question of pursuant to which CERCLA provisions an administrative settle-
ment may be entered so that the settlement will suffice for purposes of 
Section 113(f)(3)(B).  The questions that have arisen thus far before the 
courts, and what the courts have held, are discussed below. 
a. Section 106 
At least one court has held that settlements made pursuant to Section 
106 of CERCLA do not constitute Section 113(f)(3)(B) settlements.  In 
Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chemical Acquisitions LLC,101 the Southern 
District of Illinois addressed the question of whether an AOC may be 
entered pursuant to Section 106 for it to constitute an administrative settle-
ment for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(b).102  In Pharmacia, twenty PRPs 
identified by the EPA as potentially responsible for releases and threatened 
releases of hazardous substances at Sauget Area 2, an area located within 
Cahokia, East St. Louis and Sauget, Illinois, formed the Sauget Area 2 Sites 
Group (Sauget Group).103  On November 24, 2000, the Sauget Group 
entered into an AOC with the EPA requiring the Sauget Group to conduct a 
 
100. Asarco, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV04-2144-PHX-SRB, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2626, at *19 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 398, 
402 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-
87 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Ferguson v. Arcata Redwood Co., No. C03-05632SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18015, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2005); Benderson Dev. Co. v. Neumade Prods. Corp., 
No. 98-CV-0241SR, 2005 WL 1397013, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005); W.R. Grace & Co. v. 
Zotos Int’l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *16 (W.D.N.Y. May 3, 
2005); City of Waukesha v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D. Wis. 2005); 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2003); Pfohl 
Bros. Landfill Site Steering Comm. v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 134, 154-55 
(W.D.N.Y. 2003). 
101. 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Ill. 2005). 
102. Pharmacia Corp., 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1080-81. 
103. Id. 
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Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS)104 for the Sauget Area 
2 source sites.105  The AOC stated in its caption that it was an “Administra-
tive Order by Consent Pursuant to Section 106 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).”106  On May 15, 2002, the Sauget Group 
sought contribution pursuant to Section 113(f)(3)(B) for work performed 
under the AOC.107  The issue before the court was whether the AOC con-
stituted an administrative settlement for purposes of contribution pursuant 
to Section 113(f)(3)(B).108 
The Pharmacia court held that the AOC did not constitute an 
administrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B) because it was issued 
pursuant to Section 106 of CERCLA.109  The Pharmacia court explained 
that an AOC issued pursuant to Section 106 may not be an administrative 
settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B) because Section 106 makes 
no mention of settlements, but rather states “the President may also, after 
notice of the affected [s]tate, take other action under this section including, 
but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public 
health and welfare and the environment.”110  Hence, the Pharmacia court 
held that an AOC may not be issued pursuant to Section 106 if it is to be 
considered an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 
113(f)(3)(B).111 
 
104. U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/remedy/sfremedy/rifs.htm (last visited 
May 14, 2008). 
The Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) represents the methodology that 
the Superfund program has established for characterizing the nature and extent of risks 
posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites and for evaluating potential remedial 
options.  The RI serves as the mechanism for collecting data to: characterize site 
conditions; determine the nature of the waste; assess risk to human health and the 
environment; and conduct treatability testing.  The FS is the mechanism for the 
development, screening, and detailed evaluation of alternative remedial actions. 
Id. 
105. Pharmacia Corp, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. 
106. Id. at 1085. 
107. Id. at 1081. 
108. Id. at 1084. 
109. Id. at 1085.  The court decided that the AOC was issued pursuant to Section 106 
because: (1) the caption stated that the AOC was issued pursuant to Section 106(a); (2) the AOC 
stated explicitly that Section 106 governs in the event that the AOC is violated; and (3) “nowhere 
in the twenty-five pages of the AOC is the word settlement or a derivation there from used.”  Id. at 
1085-86.  Rather, the AOC refers to the AOC as an “Order.”  Id.  This is so despite the AOC 
statement that “[t]he Order is issued pursuant to the authority vested in the President of the United 
States by Sections 104, 106(a), 107 and 122 of [CERCLA].”  Id. at 1085. 
110. Id. at 1085. 
111. Id.  It is also arguable that the following rules may be gleaned from Pharmacia: (1) an 
AOC should not state that it was issued pursuant to Section 106; (2) an AOC should refer to itself 
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Subsequent to Pharmacia, no court has addressed the question of 
whether an AOC issued pursuant to Section 106 may constitute an admin-
istrative settlement under Section 113(f)(3)(B).  As noted earlier, Section 
122(d)(1)(A) states explicitly that, except with regard to certain de minimus 
settlements, “[w]henever the President enters into an agreement . . . with 
any potentially responsible party with respect to a remedial action under 
[S]ection 9606 . . . the agreement shall be entered in the appropriate United 
States district court as a consent decree.”112  Such language indicates that an 
AOC issued pursuant to Section 106 pertaining to a remedial action may 
not constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement.  To consti-
tute a settlement, it must be entered by a district court.  A PRP considering 
entering into an AOC pursuant to Section 106 must understand that such an 
agreement may not constitute an administrative settlement for purposes of 
Section 113(f)(3)(B).113 
b. Sections 122(g) and 122(h) 
At least two courts, albeit for the same case, have held that an AOC 
must be executed pursuant to Section 122(g) or 122(h) for the AOC to con-
stitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) settlement.  The Western District of Michigan 
explored the question of pursuant to what sections of CERCLA an AOC 
may be entered such that an AOC would constitute an administrative 
settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B) in ITT Industries, Inc. v. 
Borgwarner.114  In ITT Industries the district court held that for an AOC to 
constitute an administrative settlement for purposes of obtaining Section 
113(f)(3)(B) contribution, it must be a settlement made pursuant to Section 
122(g) or 122(h) of CERCLA.115  Section 122(g) of CERCLA deals with de 
minimus settlements.116  Section 122(h) of CERCLA regards cost recovery 
settlements.117  The ITT Industries court reasoned that the Supreme Court 
“made clear” in the case of Cooper Industries that “courts must read the 
right to contribution under CERCLA [Section] 113(f) in conjunction with 
the statute of limitations for such contribution actions, as set forth in 
 
as a “settlement,” not an “order”; and (3) an AOC should not cite to any part of Section 106 as a 
governing provision should it be violated. 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
113. Accordingly, the Southern District of Ohio held that an AOC for a removal action can 
be a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement.  Responsible Envt’l Solutions Alliance v. 
Waste Management, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (D. Ohio 2007). 
114. No. 06-2393, 2007 WL 3023995 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2007); No. 1:05-cv-674, 2006 WL 
2460793 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2006). 
115. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2460793, at *7-8. 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). 
117. Id. § 9622(h). 
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[Section] 113(g)(3).”118  Section 113(g)(3) references only two types of 
contribution actions: those made pursuant to Section 122(g) and those made 
pursuant to Section 122(h).119  The ITT Industries court reasoned that the 
language of Section 113(g)(3)(B) results in only two provisions of 
CERCLA pursuant to which a settlement may be entered for such a 
settlement to constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement:  
Sections 122(g) and 122(h).120 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Court of Appeals also held, citing to 
the Cooper case, that a settlement is an administrative settlement only if 
entered pursuant to Section 122(g) or 122(h) of CERCLA.121  No other 
court has specifically addressed the question of whether a Section 
113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement must be executed pursuant to Section 
122(g) or 122(h) of CERCLA.122  If the Federal District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan and the Sixth Circuit are correct in their 
assertion that a settlement constitutes an administrative settlement entitling 
the settling PRP to Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution only if it is executed 
pursuant to Section 122(g) or 122(h), in most instances only settlements 
entered pursuant to Section 122(h) will allow a settling PRP to seek Section 
113(f)(3)(B) contribution.  This is because Section 122(g)(8) states explic-
itly “as a condition for settlement” under Section 122(g): 
[T]he President shall require . . . that a potentially responsible 
party waive all of the claims (including a claim for contribution 
under this chapter) that the party may have against other 
 
118. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2460793, at *7. 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). 
120. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2460793, at *7. 
121. ITT Indus., 2007 WL 3023995, at *6.  The Sixth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court, 
in Cooper, “directs courts to read the phrase ‘administrative or judicially approved settlement’ in 
concert with subsection (g), which establishes time limitations applicable to contribution.”  Id. at 
*6 (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004)). 
122. It is noteworthy that the Zotos court indicated in dicta that it too believes that an 
administrative settlement is a settlement entered pursuant to Section 122(f) or 122(h).  W.R. Grace 
& Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8755, at *18-19 
(W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005).  The Zotos court stated, without any explanation, that “[a] state may 
settle a PRP’s CERCLA liability, assuming it has been delegated that authority to do so, by 
entering into an administrative settlement (monetary settlement pursuant to [S]ection 122(g) or 
(h)) or a judicially approved settlement (cleanup settlement pursuant to [S]ection 122(d)(1)(A)).”  
Id. 
 It is noteworthy that the legislative history of Section 113(f) is not clear as to whether 
Congress intended for administrative settlements, for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribu-
tion, to be limited to settlements made pursuant to Section 122(g) or 122(h).  The only legislative 
history found that speaks to the issue is the Conference Report for the Superfund Amendments, 
which states in relevant part: “The conference substitute adopts new [S]ection 113(f) as contained 
in the House amendments, and thus provides contribution protection for those who enter into 
administrative settlement agreements with the government, as well as those who enter into consent 
decrees for settlements.”  99 CONG. CONF. REP., H.R. REP. NO. 962 (OCT. 3, 1986). 
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potentially responsible parties for response costs incurred with 
respect to the facility, unless the President determines that 
requiring a waiver would be unjust.123 
c. Summary 
A PRP wishing to enter into a settlement that will later provide it with 
the right to contribution pursuant to Section 113(f)(3)(B) must be mindful 
of the statutory provision pursuant to which its settlement is being entered 
given some courts’ holdings regarding the same.  In particular, if a PRP 
should hope for future contribution rights, it should be wary of any settle-
ment that will be entered pursuant to any CERCLA provision other than 
Section 122(h). 
4. Category Three: Questions Addressed by the Courts in ITT 
Industries 
The Federal District Court for the Western District of Michigan and the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in ITT Industries addressed several issues 
relevant to the question of what constitutes a Section 113(f)(3)(B) adminis-
trative settlement.  However, it appears that no other courts have addressed 
these issues, and there is no unifying theme to these issues.  These issues 
are discussed below. 
a. Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan 
In ITT Industries, the Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan addressed the question of the value that should be given to EPA 
guidance regarding what constitutes a Section 113(f)(3)(B) settlement.124  
The EPA has produced a document entitled “Interim Revisions to CERCLA 
Removal, RI/FS and RD AOC Models to Clarify Contribution Rights and 
Protection Under Section 113(f)” (EPA document).125  In the EPA docu-
ment, the EPA asserts its belief that EPA AOCs, issued prior to the release 
of the EPA document, are administrative settlements for purposes of 
Section 113(f)(3)(B).126  Furthermore, in the EPA document the EPA 
 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(8)(A). 
124. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2811310, at *3. 
125. Memorandum from EPA Office of Site Remediation Enforcement and U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice to Regions I-VIII, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Envtl. Enforcement Section and Envtl. Def. 
Section (Aug. 3, 2005), available at www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/ 
superfund/interim-rev-aoc-mod-mem.pdf [hereinafter EPA Document]. 
126. Id. at 2. 
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asserts its belief that EPA AOCs, issued subsequent to the release of the 
EPA document that employ the language recommended, are administrative 
settlements for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B).127 
The Western District of Michigan disagreed with both of the EPA’s 
assertions, stating that it found such assertions to be “unpersuasive.”128  
Furthermore, the Western District of Michigan stated that the EPA’s above-
noted assertions are not entitled to Chevron deference.129  The court stated: 
“Chevron deference does not apply to every memorandum issued by a 
regulatory agency.  Instead, it specifically applies only to rules and deci-
sions issued within the regulatory authority of the agency and reached with-
in the context of an adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.”130 
Thus, the Western District of Michigan held that the statements made 
by the EPA in the EPA document are not persuasive and are not entitled to 
Chevron deference.131  Accordingly, PRPs should be aware that the EPA’s 
interpretation of what constitutes a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative 
settlement may not survive judicial scrutiny. 
b. Sixth Circuit 
In ITT Industries the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit addressed several issues, yet cited to no case law in support of its 
resolution of these issues.  First, the Sixth Circuit held that when “the EPA 
expressly reserves its right to legal action to adjudicate Plaintiff’s liability 
for failure to comply with [a settlement],” such a settlement may not 
constitute a Section 113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement.132  Second, the 
Sixth Circuit held that if a PRP does not admit its CERCLA liability in the 
language of the settlement, such a settlement may not constitute a Section 
 
127. Id. 
128. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2811310, at *3. 
129. Id.  Under the Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court held that courts must defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute that is ambiguous.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).  It is noteworthy that the EPA document states 
explicitly: 
This model language and any internal procedures adopted for its implementation and 
use are intended as guidance for employees of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. They do not constitute rulemaking by the Agency and may not be relied upon 
to create a right or a benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, 
by any person. 
EPA Document, supra note 124. 
130. ITT Indus., 2006 WL 2811310, at *3. 
131. Id. 
132. ITT Indus., Inc. v. Borgwarner, No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2007 WL 3023995, at * 6 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 18, 2007). 
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113(f)(3)(B) administrative settlement.133  Third, the Sixth Circuit held that 
a settlement whereby a PRP is not “simply reimbursing the United States 
for costs [the United States] ‘incurred’” may not constitute an administra-
tive settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B).134  A PRP considering 
settlement must be aware of the Sixth Circuit’s holdings regarding these 
three issues. 
c. Summary 
A PRP seeking to settle its liability must be mindful of the holdings of 
the ITT Industries cases.  Although it appears that no other courts have 
addressed the above-discussed issues, future courts may follow the holdings 
of ITT Industries.  A PRP should be wary of entering a settlement that 
would not survive scrutiny by the Federal District Court for the Western 
District of Michigan or the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
B. SECTION 113(F)(2) 
The courts have addressed several questions with regard to what 
constitutes an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(2).  
Four main categories of questions have arisen with regard to what 
constitutes a Section 113(f)(2) settlement.  The first category of questions 
involves the resolution of CERCLA liability.  The second category of 
questions analyzes the procedures that must be followed when entering a 
settlement.  The third category of questions pertains to the parties to the 
settlement.  Finally, the fourth category of questions involves the language 
of the settlement. 
1. Category One: Resolution of CERCLA Liability 
There is judicial agreement that a settlement must resolve a settling 
PRP’s CERCLA liability to constitute an administrative settlement for 
purposes of Section 113(f)(2).135  No case has been found whereby a court 
 
133. Id.  Although the purpose of this article is merely to inform its readers of what the 
courts have held thus far, it is important to note that Section 122(d)(1)(B) states: 
Except as otherwise provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the participation by 
any party in the process under this section shall not be considered an admission of 
liability for any purpose, and the fact of such participation, shall not be admissible in 
any judicial or administrative proceeding, including a subsequent proceeding under 
this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(B) (2000). 
134. ITT Indus., 2007 WL 3023995, at *7. 
135. See Gen. Time Corp. v. Bulk Materials, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 471, 476 (M.D. Ga. 1993) 
(“[T]he Court does not believe Congress intended for settlements effected under a state’s 
environmental statute to confer CERCLA contribution protection.”); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. 
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has held that a purported administrative settlement that did not resolve a 
settling PRP’s CERCLA liability constituted a Section 113(f)(2) adminis-
trative settlement.  Hence, for purposes of both Sections 113(f)(3)(B) and 
113(f)(2), a settlement must resolve a settling PRP’s CERCLA liability. 
2. Category Two: Procedures 
a. Due Process 
The courts have addressed due process issues with regard to the proce-
dures that must be followed for purposes of establishing a Section 113(f)(2) 
administrative settlement.  The primary due process issue has been with re-
gard to notice and comment requirements.  As noted earlier, Section 122(i) 
of CERCLA mandates that: (1) at least thirty days before a settlement may 
become final, the head of the department or agency which has jurisdiction 
over the proposed settlement must publish in the Federal Register notice of 
the proposed settlement; and (2) for a thirty-day period beginning on the 
date of publication in the Federal Register, an opportunity shall be provided 
to persons who are not parties to the proposed settlement to file written 
comments relating to the proposed settlement.136  The courts to address the 
matter have intimated that for an administrative settlement to provide a 
settling PRP with contribution protection pursuant to Section 113(f)(2), 
non-settling PRPs must have been provided the due process protections of 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.137 
CERCLA’s specific notice and comment procedures are arguably 
required only of the federal government.  However, several courts have 
recognized that because due process concerns are also present when an 
administrative settlement is entered into with a state, a non-settling party 
should still be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.138  Thus 
 
Aigner Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (“[Section 113(f)(2)]” insulates a 
potentially liable party who has settled a CERCLA action.”). 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2007). 
137. See Am. Special Risk Ins. Co. v. City of Centerline, 180 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909-10 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (intimating that for an administrative settlement to provide a settling PRP with 
contribution protection pursuant to Section 113(f)(2), non-settling PRPs must have been provided 
the due process protections of notice and opportunity to be heard); Gen. Time Corp., 826 F. Supp. 
at 476-77 (explaining that CERCLA explicitly mandates that a barred party be provided notice 
and an opportunity to be heard); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 
(W.D. Mich. 1991) (stating in dicta that a consent order failed to qualify as an administrative 
settlement because “the negotiation process was devoid of any public hearings or public comment 
that might give rise to an argument that contribution claims should be barred”). 
138. Am. Special Risk Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10; Gen. Time Corp., 826 F. Supp. at 
477; CPC Int’l, Inc., 759 F. Supp. at 1283. 
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far, no court has specifically set forth the exact due process requirements in 
such circumstances.139 
Thus, a PRP wishing to settle its CERCLA liability with the federal 
government must ensure that the agency with which it is settling adheres to 
the notice and comment requirements of Section 122 of CERCLA.140  
Furthermore, a PRP seeking to settle its CERCLA liability with a state must 
be aware that although the exact contours of the due process requirements 
have not yet been delineated, several courts have intimated that broad 
contribution protection should not be upheld when a settlement is entered 
into under a process devoid of notice or public comment.141  At the very 
least, it will likely be in the best interest of a settling PRP to ensure that the 
state entity with which it is settling provides non-settling PRPs with notice 
and an opportunity to comment. 
However, courts have held that procedures beyond those noted in 
Section 122(i) are not necessary to satisfy the requirements of due proc-
ess.142  In United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp.,143 the First Circuit 
held that a non-settling PRP does not have a due process right to be 
included in or kept aware of the settlement process.144  No court has held to 
the contrary.  And, in United States v. Serafina,145 the Federal District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that PRPs do not have a due 
process right to participate in a settlement giving rise to contribution protec-
tion pursuant to Section 113(f)(2).146  Thus, a settling PRP should concern 
itself only with whether the procedural requirements set forth by CERCLA 
are adhered to for the purpose of due process. 
 
139. Am. Special Risk Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10; Gen. Time Corp., 826 F. Supp. at 
477; CPC Int’l, Inc., 759 F. Supp. at 1283. 
140. See, e.g., Am. Special Risk Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10 (showing that Section 
122 sets forth detailed mandatory notice and comment procedures for administrative settlements 
entered into by the EPA); Gen. Time Corp., 826 F. Supp. at 476-77 (explaining that CERCLA 
requires that a barred party be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard); CPC Int’l, Inc., 
759 F. Supp. at 1283 (stating that a consent order failed to qualify as an administrative settlement). 
141. See, e.g., Am. Special Risk Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10 (intimating that contribu-
tion should not be upheld when a settlement with a state is entered into under a process devoid of 
notice or public comment); Gen. Time Corp., 826 F. Supp. at 477 (explaining that a settlement 
with a state must not be devoid of due process aspects); CPC Int’l, Inc., 759 F. Supp. at 1283 
(noting that a consent order signed by the Michigan Department of Resources and the Attorney 
General’s office could not constitute an administrative settlement because “the negotiation process 
was devoid of any public hearings or public comment that might give rise to an argument that the 
contribution claims should be barred”). 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng’r Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 93 (1st Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Serafina, 781 F. Supp. 336, 339 (M.D. Pa. 1992). 
143. 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
144. Cannons Eng’r Corp., 899 F.2d at 93. 
145. 781 F. Supp. 336 (M.D. Pa. 1992). 
146. Serafina, 781 F. Supp. at 339. 
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b. Required Procedures 
Beyond merely satisfying the contours of due process, the courts have 
held that all of the procedures set forth in Section 122(i) of CERCLA must 
be followed for a settlement to protect a settling PRP from a contribution 
action initiated by a non-settling PRP.147  In 1993, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Cornell University148 
addressed the question of whether EPA advisement to a party that it was 
removing that party from the list of PRPs for a particular Superfund site 
constitutes a Section 113(f)(2) administrative settlement, such that the party 
should be insulated from any future contribution action.149  The Second 
Circuit held that such EPA advisement of removal from a PRP list does not 
constitute a Section 113(f)(2) administrative settlement because the “proce-
dural steps necessary to effectuate a settlement under CERCLA [Section] 
9622 were not followed.”150  The Second Circuit explained that a party is 
shielded from a contribution claim only when, as required by Section 9622 
of CERCLA, the settlement is entered as a consent decree or embodied in 
an administrative order setting forth the terms of the settlement, and when 
notice of such is published in the Federal Register.151  If such procedural 
steps are not followed, then no administrative settlement for purposes of 
Section 113(f)(2) exists.152  A mere decision by the EPA not to hold a party 
liable under CERCLA does not constitute a Section 113(f)(2) settlement.153 
Similarly, in United States v. Moore,154 the Federal District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia held that if the administrative procedures set 
forth by CERCLA for entering into an administrative settlement (such as 
the public comment period mandated by Section 122(i))155 are not followed, 
then a settlement cannot constitute a Section 113(f)(2) administrative settle-
ment.156  The Moore court explained that “[t]he legislative history [of 
CERCLA] reveals that Congress was concerned about ‘sweetheart deals,’ 
and thus mandated that certain procedures be followed.”157  There is 
 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 725 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that procedures set forth in Section 122 must be followed); United States v. Moore, 703 
F. Supp. 455, 459 (E.D. Va. 1988) (opining that Section 122 procedures must be followed). 
148. 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993). 
149. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d at 724-25. 




154. 703 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Va. 1988) 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i) (2000). 
156. Moore, 703 F. Supp. at 459. 
157. Id. 
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agreement amongst the courts that the administrative procedures set forth in 
CERCLA for entering into an administrative settlement must be adhered to 
for such a settlement to constitute an administrative settlement for purposes 
of Section 113(f)(2).158 
3. Category Three: Parties to the Settlement 
a. Agreements Between Two United States Agencies 
Thus far, one court has confronted the question of whether a settlement 
between two United States agencies may constitute a Section 113(f)(2) 
settlement.  The Eastern District for Virginia encountered a settlement en-
tered into by the DOD and the EPA that the DOD later asserted shielded it 
from CERCLA contribution actions in United States v. Moore.159  The 
Moore court concluded that “a settlement between two agencies of the 
United States is not the sort of settlement envisioned by [Sections] 
9613(f)(2) and 9622(h).”160 
b. Settlements With Cities 
Two courts were found to have grappled with the question of whether a 
settlement resolving a settling PRP’s liability to a city or municipality may 
constitute a settlement for purposes of providing the settling PRP with 
Section 113(f)(2) contribution protection.  In City of New York v. Exxon 
Corp.,161 the Southern District of New York addressed the question of 
whether a settlement between the City of New York and several PRPs could 
constitute a settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(2).162  Specifically, 
the court addressed the question of whether Section 113(f)(2)’s language, 
providing contribution protection to “a person who has resolved his liability 
to the United States or a [s]tate,” allowed contribution protection to a 
person who has resolved his or her liability to a city.163  The Southern 
District of New York concluded that a settlement that operates to release a 
city’s claim against the settling PRPs provides the settling PRPs with the 
contribution protection of Section 113(f)(2).164 
 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 134-57. 
159. Moore, 703 F. Supp. at 459. 
160. Id. 
161. 697 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
162. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 686. 
163. See generally id. at 682-87. 
164. Id. at 686.  It is important to note that the question of whether a settlement with a city or 
municipality may constitute a settlement for purposes of providing the settling PRP with Section 
113(f)(2) contribution protection was addressed by the Southern District of New York in the 
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However, in 2001 in the case of City of Detroit v. Simon,165 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that “‘statutory contribu-
tion protection’ can exist only when the settlement is with the federal 
government or a state government,” not a city.166  The court explained that a 
city “is certainly not ‘the United States’” and there is “no reason to suppose 
that [a] city could be equated ‘a [s]tate.’”167  Thus, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that a city’s settlement of its environmental claims against a PRP 
could not entitle the PRP to the statutory contribution protection prescribed 
by CERCLA when a state settles its CERCLA claims.168 
There exists a disagreement between the only two courts to address the 
question of whether a settlement with a city or municipality may constitute 
a settlement for purposes of providing the settling PRP with Section 
113(f)(2) contribution protection.  Thus, it would be prudent for a PRP 
entering into a settlement with a city to be mindful of the fact that at least 
one court has held that such a settlement will not provide the settling PRP 
with contribution protection pursuant to Section 113(f)(2). 
4. The Language in the Settlement Agreement 
At least two courts have also addressed the issue of whether a 
settlement agreement must explicitly note the contribution protection of 
Section 113(f)(2) to provide a settling PRP with such contribution protec-
tion.  In General Time Corp. v. Bulk Materials, Inc.,169 the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Georgia addressed the question of 
whether a settlement agreement must specifically refer to Section 113(f)(2), 
 
context of a judicially approved settlement.  Id.  However, the court’s conclusion that a settlement 
with a city may constitute a settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(2) was not restricted to 
instances of judicially approved settlements.  Id. 
165. 247 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001). 
166. Simon, 247 F.3d at 627-28. 
167. Id. at 628. 
168. Id. at 628.  It is noteworthy that in this case the court was dealing with a peculiar 
situation, whereby during a trial the court was advised by the parties to the case that they had 
resolved their differences.  Id.  As a result, the terms of the settlement were placed on the record in 
open court.  Id.  Some weeks later, the PRP denied that there had been a meeting of the minds 
with regard to the scope of the contribution protection that the PRP was to receive from the city.  
Id.  The trial court determined that it was unable to determine precisely what the parties had 
agreed to, and denied a motion by the city for entry of a settlement judgment.  Id.  The case was 
tried to completion and a final judgment was entered on all claims.  Id.  The Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that the trial court erred as the record showed that the city’s lawyer adequately stated the 
scope of the contribution protection, and that the PRP’s lawyer acknowledged the scope of the 
protection set forth by the city’s lawyer.  Id.  It is in this context that the Sixth Circuit addressed 
the issue of whether a settlement with a city or municipality may constitute a settlement for 
purposes of providing the settling PRP with Section 113(f)(2) contribution protection.  Id. at 627-
28. 
169. 826 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. Ga. 1993). 
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or explicitly confer contribution protection, for such a settlement agreement 
to constitute an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 
113(f)(2).170  The General Time Corp. court held that “[t]he statutory 
language does not require the settlement to specifically refer to [S]ection 
113(f)(2) or to explicitly confer contribution protection.”171  Thus, the court 
held that “the absence of any contractual language providing contribution 
protection does not preclude the operation of [Section] 113(f)(2).”172 
Similarly, in Commercial Bank-Detroit v. Allen Industries, Inc.,173 the 
Eastern District of Michigan approved a settlement that did not mention 
contribution protection.174  Thus, there is agreement of at least two courts 
that a settlement agreement need not contain language providing for contri-
bution protection for the agreement to suffice for purposes of Section 
113(f)(2).  However, it may be wise for a settling PRP to request that a 
settlement agreement contain language providing for contribution protec-
tion to ensure such protection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a great deal of ambiguity as to what constitutes an administra-
tive settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(2) and Section 113(f)(3)(B) 
given the lack of statutory guidance regarding the matter.  Compounding 
the ambiguity are the courts’ differing opinions pertaining to many perti-
nent issues.  This article seeks to clarify what the courts have held con-
stitutes an administrative settlement, especially for PRPs that contemplate 
entering into a settlement that will provide them with the benefits of 
Sections 113(f)(3)(B) and 113(f)(2).  However, all should be mindful that it 
is likely that courts will continue to tackle issues pertaining to what 
constitutes an administrative settlement. Thus, the courts will further 




170. Gen. Time Corp., 826 F. Supp. at 475. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. 769 F. Supp. 1408 (E.D. Mich. 1991) 
174. See Comerica Bank-Detroit, 769 F. Supp. at 1410 (“[T]he [s]tate/GM agreement is 
silent as to contribution protection.”). 
